

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-M-272

21 September 1983


Minutes
Special Meeting
Wednesday, 21 September 1983, 1330 - 1430 Hours
Room 7D64, Langley Headquarters Building



Chairman
Presiding

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
MEMBERS PRESENT



Department of Navy
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of the Air Force
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
National Security Agency
Department of the Army
Department of Justice

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ALSO PRESENT




Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
Central Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of the Treasury
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Department of State
Department of the Army
Department of State
Executive Secretary, SECOM

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SECOM Staff



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1. The Chairman opened the meeting by inviting members' attention to copies at their places of the generic tasking from the Acting Director of the Intelligence Community Staff to seek Community adoption of uniform personnel security standards to include a counterintelligence polygraph for military personnel assigned to intelligence posts. []

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2. [] advised that the tasking resulted from an early August 1983 off-site conference of NFIC members. He reported that he had been told that one NFIC member advanced the proposal for this polygraph requirement, and that the other members had endorsed it. He advised that he had earlier informed the Deputy Director, IC Staff, of what had been done to date to get the Community to agree to include in DCID 1/14 meaningful provisions on the polygraph, and of the impact of the Chafee amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill. He stated that discussion with the Acting Director, IC Staff, refined the tasking to that of seeking Community agreement to amend DCID 1/14 to include a requirement for a counterintelligence-oriented polygraph as a condition of access to SCI. A copy of the proposed amendment to DCID 1/14 distributed at the meeting is attached. [] said he strongly supported that, and asked those present to give it their support. []

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3. Mr. Anderson reported that General Stilwell had briefed him on the results of the August off-site conference immediately following it. He stated that General Stilwell said NFIC members at the conference deplored the lack of uniform personnel security standards and the lack of national policy on use of the polygraph. Mr. Anderson advised that General Stilwell did not report any agreement to support counterintelligence use of the polygraph. Mr. Anderson stated he could not concur in that approach during the period of prohibition as that would "pour fuel on the fire" for those members of Congress who were hostile to the polygraph and/or had scheduled hearings on the subject. He referred to his memorandum on polygraph use (copy attached). []

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4. [] commented that this was not the right time to push the issue, but noted that as a security director he supported counterintelligence-oriented polygraph examinations as a condition precedent to granting SCI access. [] said he thought that, as professional security officers, members would recognize the security advantages of counterintelligence polygraph examinations in connection with access to any type of sensitive information. []

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5. [] informed members that there had been an interagency meeting on the polygraph at the Department of Justice on 20 September 1983. He advised that a proposed national policy on the subject presented there was controversial. Mr. Anderson stated that he felt certain that the White House would not approve any national policy on the polygraph. [] advised that the Department of Justice was divided on polygraph use, with the great majority being opposed. [] said he thought all SECOM members would endorse the polygraph as a useful security tool, but commented that the timing of this proposal seemed extremely poor. He noted that an attempt to force this issue now could be held by many in Congress to be an act of defiance and as an invitation to do battle on the subject. [] commented that the Chafee Amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill had not yet been passed when the off-site conference was held. [] suggested NFIC members at the conference might now take a more restrained approach to the polygraph in view of the terms of that amendment and of the hearings scheduled on the polygraph. []

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6. Mr. Anderson suggested that the SECOM respond to the Acting Director, IC Staff, by stating that members counsel delay on this issue until the Congressional hearings are over or the prohibition on expanded polygraph use expires, whichever comes first. Mr. Kotapish said he would support that position. Mr. Anderson noted that Defense had already expressed its intent to strengthen its personnel security program. He commented that the Chafee Amendment compelled them to put aside for the time being action to carry out that intent insofar as the polygraph is concerned. He noted that the scope and intensity of Congressional opposition to the polygraph gave him cause for concern about the future of existing polygraph programs. He commented that HPSCI had backed away from their previous support for the polygraph, and noted that the death of Senator Jackson removed a supporter from the ranks of the SSCI. [redacted]

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7. [redacted] asked if any member or representative supported the proposal at issue. All present indicated that they did not. The Department of State representative added that he had no prior knowledge of this issue. In response to [redacted] question on how members wanted to have their position recorded, several suggested that members at the table prepare drafts and select one for use. [redacted] offered, and SECOM members unanimously supported, the following text:

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"The DCI Security Committee met on 21 September 1983 and discussed the NFIC proposal to 'adopt uniform personnel security standards in the Intelligence Community. Include requirement for CI-oriented polygraph of military personnel assigned to intelligence posts.' It was the unanimous judgment of the SECOM members that action on such a proposal would be imprudent until the current Congressional freeze on expanded polygraph use in the Department of Defense has been lifted."

[redacted] suggested that the text include a statement endorsing the security benefits of the polygraph. SECOM members declined to do so. Maj. Andrews suggested the possible addition of a statement advising that SECOM members judge existing polygraph programs to be jeopardized by Congressional actions and initiatives. Messrs. Anderson and Rubino argued against it, noting that it could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Maj. Andrews withdrew it. [redacted]

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8. As a separate matter [redacted] asked members to advise him as soon as possible of any new topics they wished to have considered for the agenda at the annual SECOM seminar, scheduled for 11-12 October 1983 [redacted]. He also asked for comments on, and members said they would be interested in, a possible briefing at that seminar on counterterrorism plans for the 1984 Olympics to be held in Los Angeles. [redacted]

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Executive Secretary

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Proposed Addition to Paragraph 5 of DCID 1/14

Completion of a counterintelligence-oriented polygraph examination¹, or written agreement to take such an examination when requested, is a condition of access to SCI. For individuals with no previous access to classified information, and when there is no known basis for counterintelligence concern, the counterintelligence-oriented polygraph examination may be administered after they have been granted SCI access and have had an opportunity to establish a basis for testing.

¹ Counterintelligence-oriented polygraph examinations shall cover such items as falsification of personal history data; unauthorized disclosure of classified information; involvement in espionage, sabotage or subversion for a foreign power; unreported contacts or associations with foreign intelligence services and foreign governments; and knowledge of unauthorized disclosures, espionage or foreign intelligence or government contacts by others known to the individual which the individual has not reported to the U.S. Government.



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

POLICY

21 September 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Uniform Personnel Security Standards for Access to Intelligence Sources and Product


Pursuant to discussion concerning a suggestion that the DCI Security Committee adopt uniform personnel security standards for access to intelligence source and product information that would include a requirement for a counterintelligence-oriented polygraph examination of Department of Defense personnel, the following comments are offered.

The Defense Authorization Bill recently enacted by both Houses of Congress contains a pertinent amendment, quoted in part:

Sec. 1007. (a) The Secretary of Defense may not, before April 15, 1984, use, enforce, issue, implement, or otherwise rely on any rule, regulation, directive, policy, decision, or order that would permit the use of polygraph examinations in the case of civilian employees of the Department of Defense or members of the Armed Forces in any manner or to any extent greater than was permitted under rules, regulations, directives, policies, decisions, or orders of the Department of Defense in effect on August 5, 1982.

In addition, there are a number of Congressional hearings pending during which the polygraph policy of the Department of Defense, both extant and proposed, will be examined. Further, the National Security Council is considering whether formulation of a national policy concerning use of the polygraph might be feasible.

Under these conditions and circumstances, I cannot commit the Department of Defense to uses of the polygraph that go beyond those in force on August 5, 1982, which are embodied in the current Defense policy as recorded in DoD Directive 5210.48. Therefore, I cannot concur in uniform personnel security standards proposed for use to protect intelligence sources and product data that include a requirement for a polygraph examination of any employees of the Department of Defense.


Maynard C. Anderson
Director
Security Plans and Programs

Copy to:
DUSD(P)